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The capacity of state and territorial health departments
to investigate foodborne diseases was assessed by the
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists from 2001
to 2002 with a self-administered, Web-based survey. Forty-
eight health departments responded (47 states and 1 terri-
tory). The primary reason for not conducting more active
case surveillance of enteric disease is lack of staff, while
the primary reasons for not investigating foodborne disease
outbreaks are limited staff and delayed notification of the
outbreak. Sixty-four percent of respondents have the
capacity to conduct analytic epidemiologic investigations.
States receiving Emerging Infections Program (EIP) fund-
ing from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
more often reported having a dedicated foodborne disease
epidemiologist and the capability to perform analytic stud-
ies than non-EIP states. We conclude that by addressing
shortages in the number of dedicated personnel and reduc-
ing delays in reporting, the capacity of state health depart-
ments to respond to foodborne disease can be improved. 
F
oodborne illnesses are common. Each year an estimat-
ed 76 million foodborne illnesses occur, with 325,000
hospitalizations and 5,000 deaths (1), and a recent estimate
of annual costs for medical treatment, productivity loss,
and premature deaths resulting from these illnesses is $6.5
billion (2). The National Food Safety Initiative (NFSI) was
started in 1997 as an effort to decrease the incidence and
risk for foodborne illness (3). The NFSI ended in 2001, but
at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
the former NFSI funding and activities have been institu-
tionalized as an ongoing food safety program. Continued
progress on the part of regulators and industry to improve
food safety are dependent on local, state, and federal agen-
cies’ ability to conduct epidemiologic and laboratory
investigations that identify the offending agents and link
them with specific foods.
Improvements in detecting and investigating foodborne
illnesses were made during the 1990s when CDC imple-
mented the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance
Network (FoodNet), a component of the Emerging
Infections Programs (EIP), and PulseNet (4,5). EIP is a
network of epidemiology programs in state health depart-
ments that is funded and coordinated by CDC. It is intend-
ed to be a national resource for surveillance and
epidemiologic research that goes beyond the routine public
health department functions. Active, laboratory-based sur-
veillance is the foundation of 2 core EIP projects conduct-
ed at all sites: Active Bacterial Core Surveillance and
Foodborne Disease Active Surveillance. Ten states current-
ly receive EIP support from CDC. PulseNet, unlike EIP, is
intended to be a national molecular subtyping network for
foodborne disease surveillance. It was established by the
CDC in 1996 to facilitate subtyping bacterial foodborne
pathogens by state health department laboratories. Even
after implementing FoodNet and PulseNet, much work
remains to improve the state and local public health agen-
cies’capacity to detect and investigate foodborne disease. 
In 1999, CDC provided funding to both Council of
State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) and the
Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) to con-
duct assessments of states’foodborne disease investigation
capacity. The purpose of both assessments was to deter-
mine priorities for improving food safety program support.
The CSTE assessment was intended to concentrate
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ity to monitor and investigate foodborne illness. This
report presents the results of the CSTE survey, which was
conducted from October 2001 to March 2002, of 48 state
and territorial health agencies, 
An expert CSTE committee, composed of state and
local epidemiologists from Colorado; Philadelphia; and
Los Angeles County, California; an environmentalist from
DeKalb County, Georgia; a state laboratorian from Rhode
Island; staff from the CDC’s National Center for Infectious
Disease, Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases-Food
Safety Office; and CSTE staff from its national office
developed a survey instrument that was pilot-tested in 6
states and subsequently revised. The final instrument con-
sisted of 106 questions. We present analyses of selected
questions; a complete tabulation of all results and display
of the questionnaire are available from the CSTE website
(6). The data can be used as a baseline reference for future
surveys of state and territorial capacity to investigate food-
borne disease.
Methods
The assessment instrument was a self-administered,
Web-based survey. Respondents were state and territorial
epidemiologists with knowledge in the area of foodborne
diseases. The assessment was conducted from October
2001 through February 2002, and during the 5-month sur-
vey period, reminder telephone calls and emails were
made from the CSTE national office to health agencies that
had not yet responded. 
The instrument’s 106 questions covered background
information about the responding agency, epidemiologic
surveillance capacity to identify sporadic and outbreak-
related illnesses; capacity to investigate and respond to
outbreaks; public health infrastructure to support food
safety activities, defined as staffing, facilities, equipment,
supplies, information, communication between epidemiol-
ogy and laboratory units, and education and training of
staff; and legal authority of the agency. We restricted
results in this article to questions pertaining to agency
capacity and operations, barriers to the investigation of
foodborne diseases, and staffing of the epidemiology pro-
gram (a subset of “barriers”). 
Forty-eight health departments responded (47 states
[response rate = 94%] and 1 territory [Guam]);
Pennsylvania, Illinois, Nevada, and Puerto Rico did not
submit responses. Some questions did not elicit 48
responses. Responses reflect the perspective of the epi-
demiology program in the agency. The frequency and per-
centage for each response were calculated on the basis of
the total number of responses to that question. Percentages
are rounded to the nearest integer. The phrasing of ques-
tions in tables in the Results section has, in some instances,
been shortened from the exact words used in the question-
naire.
We also examined responses by whether the respond-
ing agency received EIP funding from CDC (8 of 9 EIP
sites that were funded at the time responded to the survey:
Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, New York, Minnesota,
Oregon, Tennessee, and California/San Francisco Bay)
and whether the responding agency was a jurisdiction
with large population (10 largest population states in 2000
U.S. census; number of respondents = 8; population range
33,871,648–8,186,453), medium population (states
ranked 11th to 20th in population in 2000 census; number
of respondents = 10; population range 8,049,313–
5,130,632), or small population (the remaining states and
1 territory; number of respondents = 30; population range
4,919,479– 154,805). The term “small population states”
includes 29 states and 1 territory (Guam). The 8 respond-
ing EIPsites included 3 large, 1 medium, and 4 small pop-
ulation states.
Results
Forty percent of the states receive laboratory reports
electronically. The primary reason reported for not con-
ducting more active case surveillance is lack of staff. The
primary reasons reported for not investigating foodborne
disease outbreaks are limited staff and delayed reporting of
the outbreak. Sixty-four percent of respondents have the
capacity to conduct analytic epidemiologic investigations.
Thirty-five percent of respondents have a protocol to guar-
antee chain of custody for food specimens. Eighty-one per-
cent of respondents can obtain public health laboratory,
environmental health, and sanitation support 24 hours per
day. Fifty-four percent of respondents have broadcast fax
or email capability to hospital emergency rooms and to
physicians (Tables 1–3).
We did not find that EIP sites always reported more
capacity and more advanced operations than non-EIPsites.
Agreater percentage of EIPsites than non-EIPsites report-
ed adequate capacity to conduct analytic epidemiologic
studies (88% vs. 59%) and having a regulation or statute
specifically requiring the submission of certain enteric iso-
lates to the public health laboratory (75% vs. 50%). On the
other hand, a smaller percentage of EIP sites than non-EIP
sites reported having the capacity to broadcast faxes to
hospital emergency departments (50% vs. 55%) and to
conduct syndromic surveillance for diarrheal disease (0%
vs. 18%). The percentage of EIP sites having a protocol to
guarantee chain of custody for food environmental speci-
mens was nearly the same as for non-EIP sites (38% vs.
36%).
Likewise, we found that large population states did not
consistently have more capacity and more advanced
operations than medium or small population states or
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medium states, and 52% of small population states report-
ed adequate capacity to perform analytic epidemiologic
studies. Thirty-eight percent of large states, 30% of medi-
um, and 67% of small states reported the capacity to
broadcast fax to hospital emergency departments. The dif-
ferences between state size and having a chain of custody
protocol for food specimens were relatively small (50% of
large, 40% of medium, and 30% of small population
states), while the differences in percentage reporting a
legal requirement to submit certain enteric isolates to the
public health laboratory were relatively large: 38% of large
states, 70% of medium states, and 53% of small states.
As for factors that limit ability to investigate outbreaks,
the most common reason given by both EIP and non-EIP
sites was “delayed notification” (88% vs. 83%). The per-
centage of EIP sites and non-EIP sites reporting “limited
staff” (63% vs. 68%) and “lack of importance” (50% vs.
45%) were similar. Delayed notification was the most fre-
quent reason given by large (75%), medium (100%), and
small (80%) population states for not investigating out-
breaks. Seventy percent of small states compared to 70%
of medium states and 50% of large states reported limited
staff as a reason for not investigating outbreaks.
Seventy-two percent of EIP sites versus 83% of non-
EIP sites reported having laboratory support 24 hours per
day, whereas 75% of EIP sites compared to 43% of non-
EIP sites reported having a dedicated enteric/foodborne
epidemiologist. For these same two questions, 73% of
small population states versus 100% of large and 90% of
medium states had laboratory support 24 hours per day,
and 75% of large and 80% of medium states had a dedi-
cated enteric/foodborne disease epidemiologist compared
to 30% of small population states. Lastly, during out-
breaks, 100% of EIP sites versus 68% of non-EIP sites
reported that they had enough people to enter data. For this
question, the differences between large, medium, and
small population states were relatively small (88%, 70%,
70%, respectively).
Discussion and Conclusion
In the United States, the primary responsibility for
foodborne disease surveillance and investigation lies with
state, territorial, and local health agencies, with technical
backup and funding support from CDC and other federal
agencies, including the Food and Drug Administration
and the Food Safety and Inspection Service of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. Within a state public health
agency, reducing the incidence of foodborne disease
requires a sensitive surveillance system, timely epidemio-
logic investigation of sporadic cases and outbreaks with
the most current laboratory technologies, and coordina-
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grams. 
This report is the fourth in a series by CSTE to assess
epidemiologic capacity in state and territorial health
departments. The 3 previously published surveys con-
cerned overall capacity, maternal and child health capacity,
and chronic disease capacity (7–10). While infectious
disease capacity was addressed in the overall survey
conducted from November 2001 through April 2002, this
report is the most detailed analysis of states’and territories’
foodborne disease capacity to date. The findings in the
overall capacity report concerning reasons why outbreaks
were not investigated by the state health department are
similar to findings in our report: of 42 respondents 40
(95%) reported delayed notification of case reports, 33
(79%) reported limited staff, and 31 (74%) reported com-
peting priorities for use of public health resources (7).
In the areas of foodborne disease surveillance and
investigation, our report documents that the aggregate per-
ception of a large sample of epidemiologic leaders in state
and territorial health departments is that, as of 2002, more
resources were needed. The data are self-reported and do
not include responses from a few large states and Puerto
Rico. The survey found that lack of staff was the most fre-
quent reason (81% of respondents) for not conducting
more active case surveillance, and the most frequent rea-
sons given for not investigating outbreaks were delayed
notification (83%) and limited staff (63%) (Table 2). 
Our findings are also consistent with a 50-state survey
conducted by the General Accounting Office in 2000 to
2001 (2). That survey found, for example, 32 (64%) of 50
states indicated that more trained epidemiologists were
needed at the state level to investigate outbreaks, and 44
(88%) of 50 states indicated that more trained epidemiolo-
gists were needed at the local level to investigate out-
breaks. 
If a state or territory had more epidemiologists to con-
duct surveillance, fewer delays would likely occur in
recognition of outbreaks, and more expertise would be
available to conduct investigations. Thus, by addressing
shortages in the number of dedicated personnel and reduc-
ing delays in reporting, the capacity of state health depart-
ments to respond to foodborne disease can be improved.
We also performed comparisons of EIPto non-EIPsites
and of large, medium, and small population states. Only 8
of 10 possible large population states and 8 of 9 EIP states
were included, so the analyses must be interpreted cau-
tiously. Because these comparisons were conceived after
the survey data had been collected, we did not perform
analytic statistical tests, which could be misinterpreted.
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eration of hypotheses. We observed that EIPsites more fre-
quently stated they had a dedicated foodborne disease
epidemiologist, the capacity to perform analytic epidemio-
logic studies, and sufficient personnel to enter data during
an outbreak than non-EIP sites. These findings would be
expected, however, because 1 of the 2 core EIP projects is
FoodNet. In other measures of capacity and program struc-
ture not specifically funded by the EIP programs, such as
on-call laboratory support, not much difference existed
between EIP and non-EIP sites.
The findings of this report do not indicate the quantity
of resources needed to ensure sufficient capacity to protect
the nation, and the survey results do not direct the alloca-
tion of new resources. One approach to this issue would be
to assess the reported incidence of enteric disease and
foodborne outbreaks with respect to self-reported capacity
to monitor and investigate foodborne disease. However,
the nation’s system for identifying, investigating, and
reporting foodborne diseases has not produced consistent
and reliable data of adequate quality to perform such
analyses. For example, in 1997, a total of 27 states and 3
territories reported zero outbreaks (10). More outbreaks
must have occurred than were reported. Whatever the var-
ious reasons for such underreporting, the existing surveil-
lance data are insufficient for addressing programmatic
issues, such as where to invest in the public health system
and what improvements in public health may reasonably
be expected from such investment. Nevertheless, analyses
are not needed to justify that every state and territory needs
24 hours per day epidemiologic, laboratory, and environ-
mental health and sanitation on-call response capacity, as
well as the capacity to communicate with public health and
medical care providers, policymakers, and the public.
The analyses in this report provide a picture of the sta-
tus of the nation at a time just before the distribution in
2002 of more than $1 billion to state, territorial, and local
health agencies to improve bioterrorism response and pre-
paredness capacity. Several criteria exist for the mitigation
of foodborne illness listed in the bioterrorism preparedness
cooperative agreement award notice and grant guidelines
(Procurement and Grants Office, CDC, Announcement
No. 99051). For example, having a formal outbreak inves-
tigation team is an illustration of focus area A (prepared-
ness planning and readiness) of the bioterrorism
preparedness cooperative agreement criteria; 70% of the
respondents reported having this capacity. One of the
guidelines in focus area G (education and training) is
financial support by the state health agency for enteric dis-
ease and foodborne illness continuing education; more
than half of the respondents in this survey reported that
their agency provides this financial support. Although only
54% of states and territories reported that they could send
broadcast faxes of health information to emergency depart-
ments, this particular capacity is a high priority for bioter-
rorism preparedness and is almost certain to have been
further improved since the survey was completed.
In addition to the food safety minimum performance
and capacity standards for epidemiology and surveillance
adopted by CSTE as a position statement in 2003 (11), we
recommend that for the short-term, objective measures of
foodborne disease surveillance, reporting, and investigation
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example, the intervals from enteric disease onset until the
case is reported to CDC may be measured in each state
agency. Such measures can be used to indicate areas of
need, to document areas of improvement, and to support the
appropriation of new funds and the allocation of resources
in lieu of enteric disease incidence.
This survey and the surveys of overall, maternal and
child health, and chronic disease epidemiologic capacity
demonstrate a need for a larger workforce of epidemiolo-
gists. In response to the surveys, CSTE convened a work-
force summit of leaders from within the CSTE
organization, CDC, the Association of State and Territorial
Health Officers, the American Public Health Association,
and the Association of Schools of Public Health in January
2004 (12). In addition, at its annual meeting held in June
2004, the CSTE membership approved a resolution calling
for an annual National Epidemiologist Awareness Day to
bring attention to the work of epidemiologists in protecting
the nation’s health (12). While this report and the men-
tioned activities of CSTE are specific to disease prevention
by states and territories in the United States, similar capac-
ities may be needed by public health agencies in other
regions of the world, such as the European Union and the
WHO Global Salm-Surv programme. We hope that the
survey design and the results will provide guidance and
comparisons for readers in other countries.
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